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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The security challenges that European states face 
– now and in the future – are daunting. Increased 
complexity of critical infrastructures, climate change, 
extraordinary technological innovation, international 
power shifts, cyber-attacks, energy shortages 
and environmental degradation create new and 
unforeseen challenges. In addition, Europe faces 
‘conventional’ yet very demanding civil security 
challenges in response to natural disasters, industrial 
accidents and terrorist threats. 
Traditional approaches and systems for crisis 
management may become insufficient in the face of 
these threats. Europe will therefore increasingly need 
to cooperate with neighbours, regional organisations, 
civil society, the international community and private 
sector.  
 
If cooperation is essential, European states need to 
deepen their understanding and be ready to learn 
from each other. Different states and regions have 
diverse legal frameworks, threat perceptions, policy 
priorities and share different experiences and values. 
They must understand the structural differences 
and underlying similarities between national security 
systems if they are to meet these conflicting ends of 
deepening international cooperation and respecting 
local and national diversity. 
Exploring the scope for European cooperation in the 
area of crisis and emergency management has been 
the core contribution of the ANVIL (Analysis of Civil 
Security Systems in Europe) project, which maps the 
cultural, institutional, legal and operational diversity of 
22 national civil security systems and 8 sub-regional 
organisations in Europe. Such a broad perspective 
helps to overcome simplistic assumptions about the 
‘best way’ to handle crisis, be they purely national, 
sub-regional or supranational. 
Our analysis reveals that administrative 
responsibilities, legal frameworks and operational 
practices differ markedly, as the national systems are 
rooted in national contexts and historical experiences. 
Intriguingly, we did not discover drastic differences 
in effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy. So while 
there may be room for improvement in specific areas, 
there is no single best or ‘one-size-fits all’ model for 
civil security.
We found that arrangements for cross-border 
assistance in and outside the EU are generally well 
developed. The EU may not be a highly visible actor 
in transboundary civil security, but EU coordination 
basically enjoys wide support among citizens (though 
some bigger member states remain hesitant to 
support further integration leaps).
What does this mean for European cooperation in 
the face of transboundary crises and disasters? 
First of all, we argue that societal and civil security, 
which is embedded in deep local knowledge 
and public support, cannot be imposed from the 
top.  Our findings suggest a specific role for the 
European Union as a facilitator and promoter of 
transboundary cooperation. While standardisation of 
national structures and processes does not appear 
helpful or necessary, the EU could play a role in the 
development of a shared framework used to identify 
lessons learned and ‘best practices’ in a bottom-up 
manner. 
This paper draws from the work of the EU FP7 
– ANVIL project to outline key differences and 
similarities in national civil security systems in Europe. 
It takes the ANVIL analysis further by suggesting the 
EU’s role in enhancing compatibility is best oriented 
in a few specific directions. Namely, the EU should 
act as a promoter (illuminating likely cooperation 
obstacles) and a facilitator (supporting, through 
resources and as a discussion platform, lesson 
learning). Academics as well as policymakers should 
take note. The findings contained herein are relatively 
rare in so far existing studies of the EU’s growing role 
in societal security tend to focus on the European 
level. Taking account of domestic variation fills a gap 
in current research about European security and 
safety issues.
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INTRODUCTION: NEW CHALLENGES DEMANDING 
TRANSBOUNDARY COOPERATION
Civil security systems in Europe have traditionally 
displayed a wide variation in structures, policies, rules 
and practices: countries have organized differently 
in their efforts to protect citizens from threats to 
their security and safety. Each system evolved in a 
unique historical and cultural context. Each is bound 
by different legal/constitutional frameworks. Each 
system consists of different actors and is governed 
differently. Each system has different relations with 
private sector parties. And each system relates to its 
citizens in unique ways. 
Given the variety of major threats faced by countries, 
diversity in practice and process is to be expected 
and respected. Experience and research show 
that the great variety amongst crisis management 
structures in national systems, processes and 
practices is not necessarily a bad thing. Analysts 
agree that there is no ‘one best way’ to approach 
crisis and disaster management for all types of 
contingencies. 
As the European continent turns its attention to 
coping with ‘transboundary’ crises – those that jump 
political, geographical and sectoral boundaries – 
this diversity in national civil security systems must 
be better understood to explore avenues for future 
cooperation. Academics studying the EU’s growing 
security role are often transfixed on European-level 
programmes and legislation. We argue that they 
must incorporate national empirical realities in their 
analysis, which helps us understand why unified 
statements of political principle in Brussels are not 
always, and rarely easily, matched by operational 
diversity in member states. This gap can be bridged, 
but it requires increased research, analysis and 
debate – which we hope to stimulate with this paper.[1]
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THE ANVIL PROJECT:  
MAPPING CIVIL SECURITY SYSTEMS
This paper draws from the work of the EU FP7 
– ANVIL project to outline key differences and 
similarities in national civil security systems in Europe. 
The ANVIL project draws together existing data and 
collects additional information where necessary to 
map the variety and similarities in Europe’s regional 
civil security structures, practices and cultures. It 
investigates if, and to what extent, variety affects the 
security and safety of Europe’s citizens (for better or 
worse). The ANVIL project generated 22 case studies 
of national civil security systems and 8 studies of 
sub-regional organisations in Europe, and did so 
according to a common mapping protocol.[2]
We define ‘civil security systems’ as the policies, 
bodies and mechanisms that a country or region has 
in place to protect it against new and urgent threats 
to the security of people and/or the functioning of 
critical infrastructures. Each government in Europe 
has such a system in place to provide ‘societal 
security’ – we may say that this is a core task of the 
sovereign state. Citizens expect their governments 
to design and operate capabilities to prevent risks 
from emerging, to prepare for crises and disasters, 
to protect values and infrastructures from harm, 
to respond effectively with sufficient capacity and 
effective decision-making when a crisis does occur, 
and to recover swiftly after a crisis strikes.
A crucial question is if and how we can measure the 
quality – defined in terms of effectiveness, efficiency 
and legitimacy – of these civil security systems. In 
defining quality, we should keep in mind that different 
systems can be equally effective. What risks a nation 
should prepare for differ per country or region. In 
recent years, we have seen forest fires in Southern 
Europe, industrial accidents in France, a massive 
earthquake in Italy, flooding in Central and Eastern 
Europe, terrorist attacks in the UK and Spain, and 
infrastructure failures in Scandinavia (to name but a 
few recent events). In response to different crises, 
and shaped by different administrative traditions, risk 
cultures and legal constraints, different systems have 
evolved.
This paper presents the most important findings 
of the ANVIL case studies[3] and takes the ANVIL 
analysis further by suggesting the EU’s role in 
enhancing compatibility is best oriented in a few 
specific directions. We suggest the EU should focus 
its efforts in acting as a promoter (illuminating likely 
cooperation obstacles) and a facilitator (supporting, 
through resource provision, and providing a discussion 
platform for lesson learning) rather than a top-
down driver (approving binding rules and mandating 
approaches).
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RESEARCH FINDINGS
1. CHANGES UNDERWAY, BUT WITH 
A STRONG LOCAL FLAVOUR 
Since the end of the Cold War and continuing 
between 2000 and 2012, all systems underwent 
considerable reform. This is evidenced by the trend 
towards all-hazards approaches, a clear civilian 
primacy, some cross-national borrowing in areas like 
risk and threat assessment and updated functional 
legislation. However, there are also important 
differences when it comes to the form, understanding 
and consequences of transformation.
Refl ecting the transformation from military-focused 
civil defence systems since the end of the Cold War, 
crisis management is now fi rmly geared towards 
dealing with various civilian crises. New concerns 
have supplemented or even replaced the dominant 
fear of nuclear war in Europe. Refl ecting the recent 
experience of different types of crises (Figure 1), 
the civil security systems in most of the countries 
we studied focus on natural disasters. Industrial/
transportation accidents occur regularly but are 
mostly manageable at the local level. Large-scale 
and sustained ‘critical infrastructure’ failures are rare 
and of comparably limited impact to date. Violent 
events, such as terrorist attacks, are similarly isolated 
occurrences in a few countries among our sample, 
even if they attract major political and societal 
attention. Overall, few analysed countries experienced 
highly salient ‘signature crises’, which would put an 
entire national crisis management system to the 
test. Despite a basic level of shared conceptual 
understanding, ANVIL confi rmed that the defi nition of 
crisis is not just a matter of quantitative measures but 
also depends on a country’s cultural and institutional 
context, such as the requirements of high level 
coordination or previous crisis experiences.
In line with these changed threat perceptions and 
challenges since the end of the Cold War, civilian 
actors are by now clearly the prime actors in crisis 
management. In all countries studied by ANVIL, 
military forces regularly contribute to civil security 
efforts at the behest of civilian authorities, at least 
when it comes to exceptional and prolonged crises. 
The ease, frequency and acceptance of domestic 
military deployment, however, vary considerably.
Furthermore, the majority of countries tend towards 
an ‘all-hazards’ rather than a ‘specifi c threats’ 
approach, but this is a matter of degree rather 
than a clear-cut distinction and there is a marked 
gap between rhetoric and practice (one can thus 
question the practical relevance of the formally 
distinct approaches).[5] In fact, it can be argued that all 
countries have elements of both an all-hazards and a 
specifi c threats approach. Many states loosely refer 
to comprehensive approaches in their overall security 
strategies and have introduced some form of umbrella 
laws, but then have various additional strategies and 
functional legislation for various types of crises. Civil 
security in this context can be considered a nascent 
policy fi eld with fuzzy borders and strong interference 
with other areas. Crisis management commonly 
relies on a number of cabinet departments and 
functional agencies, is often taken up by agencies 
as a temporary function, and many related areas are 
regulated in various functional laws.
The turn towards all-hazards approaches has been 
accompanied by the proliferation of risk-based 
planning and formalised risk and threat assessments. 
However, integral and advanced risk management has 
penetrated national systems to very different degrees 
and in different ways. It is very diffi cult to assess 
in how far countries make substantive use of such 
formal risk assessments and risk-based planning in 
practice.
2. COMPLEX INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
AND VARYING DEGREES OF CENTRALIZATION
The case studies reveal very complex institutional 
arrangements and varying degrees of centralisation. 
Civil security systems usually mirror the regular 
setup of national governments, but they are often 
comparatively more decentralised than other policy 
fi elds. This becomes particularly apparent in the 
Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding errors.                                    
Source: ANVIL case studies.
Natural disasters and 
infectious diseases
Industrial/transportation 
accidents
Critical infrastructure 
failures
Terrorist attacks, other vio-
lent international threats
FIGURE 1:
TYPES OF CRISES EXPERIENCED (2000-2012)[4]
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strong operational involvement of local and regional 
agencies, especially emergency services and fi re 
brigades. Decentralisation, however, is often less 
marked when it comes to specialised, complex 
threats, such as epidemics or nuclear disasters, in the 
formulation of overall civil security policies.
The degree of centralization varies considerably 
across countries, refl ecting different cultural traditions 
and institutional arrangements (see Figure 2). North-
Western countries prefer decentralised forms of 
organisation whereas ‘new’ members in Central/
Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, especially the 
Baltic countries and those on the Balkans, feature, 
on average, more centralised, top-down systems. Yet 
these differentiations are not absolute and uniform.
The question of centralisation is directly related to 
arrangements for up- and down-scaling of crisis 
management responsibilities. Countries differ 
with regard to the degree of formalisation of such 
arrangements. In most countries, lower levels of 
government formally retain the authority to upscale 
responsibilities and request assistance from higher 
levels. It appears that the new focus on natural and 
man-made hazards has challenged the traditional, 
military-oriented emergency laws with a predilection 
towards centralised, top-down control. The majority 
of studied countries have made separate provisions 
for declaring a ‘state of disaster’ as defi ned in 
their country. Four of the 22 studied countries 
do not have formal legal provisions allowing an 
emergency declaration (Austria, Croatia, Sweden and 
Switzerland), while mechanisms for up-scaling follow 
a comparable bottom-up and civilian-driven logic.
The case studies also reveal very different 
arrangements regarding the number and structure 
of implementing agencies for civil security. Typically, 
operational crisis management during most scenarios 
is a shared responsibility of several local agencies 
and emergency responders, most notably fi re 
brigades, emergency medical services, police and 
voluntary emergency organisations. There is a wide 
variety of permanent or ad-hoc crisis coordination 
centres. Even federalist states like Germany and 
Switzerland have taken some steps to design 
countrywide crisis coordination centres, even if they 
cannot exercise direct operational command. Thus, 
there seems to be a consensus that some level of 
centralisation is desirable. Yet, nationally specifi c legal 
and political setups remain the primary variables that 
determine the involvement, shape and competences 
of lead agencies in civil security, particularly at higher 
levels of government.
Policy formulation usually resides with central 
governments, except for federal states. However, 
policymaking on civil security can be a complex 
exercise involving many different levels, departments 
and agencies as the issue touches upon many 
areas and the portfolio of associated actors. In most 
countries, mayors and/or district commissioners 
play an important role in local and regional civil crisis 
management and often lead civil security steering 
groups or commissions on the regional level.
3. STRONG USE OF VOLUNTARY 
ORGANIZATIONS
Formal citizen obligations generally focus on specifi c 
contributions during acute emergencies at the 
request of operational agencies (with potentially more 
invasive measures during states of emergency or 
disaster), whereas more regular and general demands 
for crisis preparation are less common. The observed 
variation ranges from a few countries that have more 
extensive binding provisions, such  as mandatory 
civil protection services or obligatory insurances, to 
cases where citizens’ obligations and responsibilities 
in civil security are not formally specifi ed (Malta, 
Netherlands and Serbia).
Voluntary organisations make an important 
contribution to civil security provision in most ANVIL 
countries. The degree of organisational coherence 
and formalisation of cooperation between public 
agencies and societal actors, however, varies 
considerably. Especially Central European states with 
neocorporatist traditions, such as Austria, embrace 
the formalized inclusion of offi cially registered 
organisations with large membership and see this as 
Source: ANVIL case studies
0
1
2
3
FIGURE 2: 
DEGREE OF CENTRALISATION OF CIVIL SECURITY 
SYSTEMS (DECENTRALISED - 0, CENTRALISED - 3)[6]
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one of the core strengths of their systems 
(Figure 3). Conversely, other countries, like the 
UK, prefer informal ad-hoc forms of voluntary 
participation. In some South-Eastern states, namely 
Romania and Serbia, we fi nd more ambivalent 
attitudes regarding voluntary engagement going 
back to volunteerism campaigns during communist 
rule. These societies apparently tend to have high 
expectations of the state in the protection of citizens 
but also remain wary of state institutions and their 
efforts to incorporate citizens. But also some of the 
‘old’ member states with strong formal volunteerism 
are struggling to preserve high levels of organised 
voluntary engagement due to social challenges such 
as demographic change or growing workloads.
Citizens expect governments to ensure a basic 
degree of protection, but disasters are not among 
the major concerns of citizens in ANVIL countries. 
Beyond this relative sense of safety, levels of concern 
are higher in some countries (especially many ‘new’ 
members and Italy) while citizens in the Netherlands 
and Scandinavian countries are least concerned 
(Figure 4). Many case studies also highlight that 
concerns about civil emergencies and crises in 
general remains low in comparison to other national 
issues for concern, such as economic growth, 
unemployment or environmental protection.
Communication and education about preparedness 
and response is mostly passive. Traditional tools like 
TV/radio warnings and alarm sirens are still dominant, 
though there is a nascent trend indicating the more 
frequent use of new technologies and applications. 
The use of mobile applications for reaching citizens 
is not very advanced. Moreover, systems for alarming 
and warning during impending and unfolding crises 
seem to be more developed than those for outreach 
and education, which are often limited to the passive 
distribution of publications or fi rst aid courses for 
targeted groups. Our fi ndings suggest an overall low 
level of knowledge among citizens regarding crisis 
preparedness and response, with an EU average 
of around 27 per cent according to Eurobarometer 
data. On the one hand, this indicates a certain lack 
of public interest and awareness, but it may also be 
interpreted as a sign of trust or a lack of alarmist 
attitudes in European societies.
4. LIMITED ROLE FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR
In most ANVIL countries, profi t-oriented actors 
are clearly less involved in civil security and crisis 
management than voluntary, non-profi t organisations. 
Outsourcing of core tasks in crisis management is 
not a major trend. Private companies usually play 
a limited role based on legal safety requirements 
and special tasks in local emergency management 
around production facilities or infrastructures. 
Some smaller, ‘new’ EU member states with weaker 
capacities seem to be more interested in striking 
partnerships between governmental agencies and 
profi t-oriented private entities than North-Western 
European countries. Furthermore, the UK is an outlier 
in its substantial role given to the private sector. In 
general, however, evidence suggests that Western 
and Northern European countries are less inclined to 
outsource offi cial civil security tasks.
Aside from the persistence of traditional public 
and non-profi t actors in civil security systems, one 
can discern a nascent trend towards increased 
FIGURE 3: 
NUMBER OF OFFICIAL VOLUNTEERS PER 1,000 CAPITA
Austria
Hungary
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Germany
Switzerland
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France
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0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Source: ANVIL case studies[7]
FIGURE 4: CITIZEN CONCERN AND TYPES OF THREATS
Source: Special Eurobarometer 383[8]
Percentage of citizens feeling ‘very concerned’ about natural disasters, man-made disasters and terrorist attacks.
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coordination and networking with for-profit actors 
with regard to ‘new’ security areas, such as critical 
infrastructure protection and cyber-security. 
These areas call for the inclusion of specialised 
knowledge and enhanced outreach to the developers 
and operators of the central technologies and 
infrastructures. In various countries, this has 
translated into a series of public-private-partnerships 
and common platforms for coordination and 
information exchange (e.g. Austria, Finland, Germany, 
Italy, Switzerland and the UK), supported by related 
policy and research initiatives of the EU.
5. PERCEIVED AS EFFECTIVE
In assessing effectiveness, the country case studies 
focused on the outcomes of incident-related political 
and professional inquiries.
The number of professional and political inquiries 
varied due to diverse inquiry cultures as well as 
varying exposures to disasters. For most countries, 
there is no precise data of the number of professional 
and political inquiries. While countries such as 
the Netherlands and Sweden feature a strong 
professional investigation culture and a high density 
of evaluations and inquiries, the number of inquiries 
in most countries is rather low. There are also 
differences in style and methodology ranging from 
formalised and mandatory evaluations by external 
experts to ad hoc political assessments. Generally, 
most evaluations suggest that stakeholders consider 
their systems to be rather well prepared for most 
crises even if they also see some system-specific 
issues to be further improved as well as distinct 
deficits in the handling of concrete incidents. The 
most common shortcomings identified in inquires 
refer to problems in coordination, planning and 
preparation, forecasting and warning, control and 
overview, and expertise at the local level.
These diverse and intermittent evaluation practices 
underline the difficulties of providing grounded, 
accurate and unambiguous assessments of the 
overall effectiveness of a country’s civil security 
system. There are no common standards for 
effectiveness assessment in Europe, which could 
be expected to command wide acceptance and 
support. There is no evidence of a strong, systematic 
relationship between specific operational, cultural 
or political features of civil security systems (e.g. the 
degree of centralization or voluntary engagement) 
and effectiveness measures, as based on available 
national reports. This generates challenges as well as 
opportunities for a more intensive EU engagement in 
comparative assessments and learning processes.
6. EFFICIENCY:  
DISPERSED AND UNKNOWN COSTS
Assessments of financial cost-benefit efficiency are 
one of the least developed aspects of national civil 
security systems. Only a few countries have even 
begun to collect more systematic data and to use 
investment review instruments. Overall, one might 
say that most governments do not have a clear 
overview of their spending on civil security and crisis 
management.
This lack of data can be partially explained by the 
inherent difficulties of measurements. Civil security 
in many cases is not a coherent political and 
administrative field but rather a cross-cutting task 
with fuzzy borders that, depending on the definition, 
overlaps with several other political and administrative 
fields, such as public health, water management, 
transportation or energy. Moreover, decentralisation 
of crisis management often leads to multi-level 
financing, with regions and/or municipalities playing 
an important part in the financing scheme.
As a consequence, there are no clear assessment 
standards allowing for clear statements regarding 
the delicate balance between the need to protect 
societies and prevalent fiscal constraints. Yet, the 
perception is one of relatively adequate levels 
of expenditure with regard to potential threats. 
Efficiency does not often feature as a core concern. 
In fact, underfunding is more likely to be an issue 
than excessive spending, even in the relatively secure 
set of countries studied by ANVIL (see figure 1). 
International organisations similarly highlight the 
benefits and need for further investments in effective 
disaster prevention and response management under 
conditions of global climate and economic change.
7. SOUND LEGITIMACY
Civil security in the ANVIL countries generally seems 
to be characterised by a low degree of politicisation 
and contestation. Electoral results have not been 
strongly or negatively affected by the management 
of a crisis during the last decade. We found only a 
few instances of visible, intense turmoil leading to the 
resignations of high-profile politicians, incisive court-
rulings or popular unrest. In a few cases, national 
political leaders exploited the state’s performance 
during an event to generate consensus or to oppose 
the government. Major legal cases in the area of crisis 
management are rare and mainly related to financial 
compensations after disasters in the recovery and 
reconstruction phases. Despite some widely noted 
natural disasters, such as L’Aquila earthquake, one 
could not point to a truly profound crisis of public 
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legitimacy and trust, as occurred, for instance, after 
Hurricane Katrina in the US.
Consequently, a majority of citizens appear to have 
a positive attitude towards civil security and feel 
generally safe, though levels of support and safety 
differ somewhat geographically. It seems fair to say 
that a non-alarmist attitude regarding civil security is 
dominant in most ANVIL countries. At the same time, 
there are notable relative differences between ‘old’ 
and ‘new’ EU member states when citizens are asked 
whether their country is doing enough to manage 
crises (see Figure 5). Overall, there seems to be a 
basic level of tacit acceptance and support, but it is 
important to remember that open public debate about 
fundamental issues, such as the domestic use of the 
military, remain a democratic necessity.
8. A LIMITED ROLE FOR REGIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS
Regional organisations are a regular feature of 
European governance in many issue areas and in 
different geographical areas, including in the fi eld of 
civil security. Our systematic investigation of eight 
such organisations[10], primarily in South-Eastern 
Europe and the Baltic/Barents region, reveals that 
such organisations are weakly institutionalised, 
have limited competences in crisis and emergency 
management (since it is sometimes not part of their 
respective priorities) and depend on often reluctant 
member states for fi nancial resources and operational 
capacities.
Regional organisations are capable of facilitating 
training and exercises as well as of deepening 
cross-border ties between national offi cials, with a 
special emphasis on prevention and preparedness. 
Furthermore, regional organisations can enable 
cross-national, technical cooperation even in areas 
that are otherwise prone to confrontation. This way, 
they can play an important symbolic and political 
function, especially in regions that have experienced 
major confl icts or are undergoing transformation 
processes. The civil security work of the studied 
organisations is generally not well known to the wider 
public and engagements with private actors are 
limited. However, some important steps have been 
taken to reach out to a wider audience, such as public 
education events e.g. the distribution of a ‘Danube 
Box’ for crisis preparation and the Danube and Sava 
days for information, which are considered to be good 
practice and are beginning to be emulated.
Organisations from one region that share common 
threats and cultural contexts occasionally cooperate, 
whereas cross-regional cooperation is rare. 
Multilateral organizations are not directly involved in 
regional cooperation efforts either, but they serve as 
an important source of funding and standards. This 
especially applies to the EU in the context of Eastern 
and South-Eastern cooperation, where it exercises 
a wider structural role for regional cooperation. 
While member states seem, on the whole, more 
likely to support further intensifi cation of regional 
operational projects and information sharing in an 
intergovernmental format, one can expect that the 
EU will continue to grow as an umbrella framework 
for regional organisations in terms of funding and 
legislation. The regional organisations, in turn, act as 
transmission belts for decisions reached at EU level 
and as organized platforms for hosting EU funded 
projects and conferences. A consistent framework for 
such interactions between regional organisations and 
the EU, however, cannot be identifi ed and depends 
on the specifi c regional geographical and historical 
context.
9. DEVELOPED FRAMEWORK FOR EXTERNAL 
ASSISTANCE, BUT RELUCTANT USE
All ANVIL countries are fi rmly embedded in 
multilateral arrangements for civil emergency 
management. The legal framework for external and 
cross-border assistance is generally well developed, 
notwithstanding a handful of exceptions due to 
exceptional political situations between neighbours. 
Most of the countries examined in ANVIL have signed 
formal bilateral agreements on emergency assistance 
with nearly all of their neighbours. Local cross-
border cooperation during everyday emergencies 
often prospers on the basis of established contacts 
between ground-level offi cials and agencies.
FIGURE 5: ARE COUNTRIES DOING ENOUGH?
Source: Special Eurobarometer 371[9]
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During the period 2000-2012, only four ANVIL 
countries asked for and received assistance during 
major emergencies more than two times (France, 
Hungary, Italy, Slovakia) whereas six countries 
received assistance one or two times (Czech 
Republic, Ireland, Poland, Romania, Sweden, UK) 
and twelve countries did not receive any assistance 
(Austria, Croatia, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Serbia, 
Switzerland). There is no evident pattern in requests 
for assistance. Requests do not systematically 
correlate with indicators like size, degree of 
decentralization, regional location or economic 
capacity. To some degree, it is simply a matter of the 
actual occurrence of major disasters. However, many 
states seem to be willing to provide assistance during 
international assistance missions but remain reluctant 
to ask for help during domestic crises. Especially the 
German case study refers to an attitude that stresses 
the explicit belief that bigger countries should be able 
to handle large crises alone.
10. NATIONAL CIVIL SECURITY IN THE 
EU CONTEXT: BASIC ACCEPTANCE, 
LOW VISIBILITY
In the past years, the EU has steadily built 
administrative arrangements that can help its member 
states coordinate their support in joint responses 
to disasters occurring inside or outside Europe. The 
EU’s Civil Protection Mechanism has been in place 
since 2001 and is currently undergoing reform. 
New initiatives such as the Emergency Response 
Coordination Centre (the ERCC, which replaced the 
Monitoring and Information Centre) further strengthen 
the EU’s role. 
Most EU citizens are not aware of EU coordination in 
civil security. Only in the cases of Malta and Lithuania, 
the percentage of awareness of EU civil protection 
actions reaches 50 per cent (or more). The EU is 
least visible in civil protection in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Sweden. Overall, we see in our sample 
of countries that the EU is not a very visible actor in 
delivering civil protection.
Yet, European citizens overwhelmingly believe 
that joint action is more adequate to deal with civil 
emergencies than actions by individual states (see 
Figure 9). When asked, more than 70 per cent feel 
that EU coordinated action can cope better with 
civil crises than national endeavours (see Figure 6). 
In all countries for which we had data available, the 
number of respondents who have a positive opinion 
towards EU coordination in civil security is more than 
70 per cent, with the Slovaks and the Lithuanians 
agreeing the most with this statement (86) and the 
Romanians agreeing the least (75). This wide support 
contrasts with the reluctance of some of the ‘biggest’ 
member states regarding a further deepening and 
centralization of civil security cooperation via the EU.
Member states have activated the Civil Protection 
Mechanism for assistance requests to very different 
degrees. France has activated the Mechanism fi ve 
times, Italy four and Hungary two. Yet, 13 of the 20 
ANVIL countries participating in the Mechanism 
never activated it.[12] It is very diffi cult to distinguish 
patterns in this activation of the Mechanism. 
Among the countries that have never activated it 
are large and small, founding and new, centralised 
and decentralised members. In general, participant 
countries in the Civil Protection Mechanism are 
much more willing to channel assistance through the 
mechanism than accepting assistance from it through 
offi cial activations.
All countries of our sample, apart from Serbia and 
Switzerland, participate in the training activities 
organised by the Community Mechanism. Small 
countries tend to participate less in simulation 
exercises (for example Latvia, Lithuania, Ireland, and 
Malta) which may be due to budget and personnel 
restraints.[13]
FIGURE 6: AWARENESS OF AND 
SUPPORT FOR EU COORDINATION
Source: Special Eurobarometer 383 [11]
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When it comes to financial assistance granted by 
the EU through the Solidarity Fund (aid aiming at 
the post-crisis relief of a country), comparatively rich 
member states in the ANVIL sample also received 
the largest amount of financial support. France 
and Italy have applied and received financial aid six 
times, whereas Romania did so 4 times. The great 
beneficiaries for the period 2002-2012 have been 
Italy, Germany, France, the UK, Austria and the Czech 
Republic (with the amount of funding descending 
from Italy to the Czech Republic). In sum, one cannot 
speak of a structural bias or pattern in the use of 
EU assistance, which could indicate persistent 
national weaknesses in civil security systems or other 
incentives for demanding external support. Instead, 
one may rather surmise that effective EU support is 
closely aligned with real needs as well as national 
administrative capacities for request and delivery.
On a political level, governments of some of the 
bigger states remain sceptical towards further EU 
cooperation in matters of civil security and disaster 
management. The UK case study notes that the 
‘Euroscepticism’ of British political elites also shapes 
their perception of the EU’s role in civil security. The 
actual protection of populations is regarded as a 
domestic issue directly related to the core of national 
sovereignty. German officials generally support more 
informal forms of coordination and exchange but 
oppose moves to establish operational capacities and 
command at the EU level. This is due to Germany’s 
strong esteem for decentralised solutions under the 
subsidiarity principle. Furthermore, there is also a fear 
that EU cooperation might become a ‘one-way street’ 
with Germany having to bear the financial burden for 
Southern and Eastern member states, despite a lack 
of clear evidence. French stakeholders support an EU 
role in risk and threat assessment and best practices 
but could also envision some sharing of equipment 
while opposing more substantial harmonisations. 
These findings seem to mirror the ‘typical’ stances 
these countries take vis-à-vis the EU.
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CONCLUSIONS AND NEXT STEPS
We did not find evidence that relates the diverse 
national structures and institutions to differences 
in performance and in the quality of civil security 
systems. This speaks against a ‘one-size-fits 
all’ approach on the basis of seemingly evident 
functional needs of crisis management. Some 
further observations are worth making as a way to 
summarise the project and outline steps forward.
•  An over-riding and common trend in Europe 
has been the long-term transformation of civil 
protection from primarily a military responsibility 
– as during the Cold War – to a fully civilian-
controlled system, even though military capacities 
are used to varying degrees in support of crisis 
management in different countries.
•  There is a clear tendency towards ‘all-hazards’ 
civil security systems (or ‘multi-hazards’ in some 
systems). Crises are increasingly managed by 
civilian authorities that need to cooperate across 
functional boundaries to address the evolving 
nature of contemporary threats. However, 
depending on the country and issue, certain 
scenarios remain tied to specific authorities and 
national crisis response protocols, such as in the 
case of an epidemic. There is often a gap between 
rhetoric and practice when it comes to the 
implementation of comprehensive approaches and 
strategies.
•  Even in unitary states, civil security stands out 
as a rather decentralised field compared to other 
policy fields. This is most apparent in the strong 
role of local fire brigades and emergency services. 
Decentralisation and bottom-up approaches are 
most marked in federalist states and – to a lesser 
extent – the Nordic countries and the Netherlands 
while many ‘new’ members and candidate 
countries, especially the Baltic states and those 
on the Balkans, seem to prefer more centralised, 
top-down models.
 
•  ANVIL did not find a defined preference for 
strong central top-down steering and command 
structures for the purposes of crisis preparedness 
and response.
 
•  Our research uncovered diversity in terminology 
for crisis management, emergency response, 
civil protection etc., which is mostly tied to 
specific national legal systems and division of 
competences between governmental levels.  
A common European language on civil security 
may thus appear desirable, but is unlikely to reach 
beyond top-level administrators and managers.
 
•  Countries diverge markedly on the role of NGOs 
and volunteers in civil security. There seems 
to be a basic mainstream model of volunteer 
involvement through voluntary fire brigades and 
emergency and rescue services at the local level. 
However, there are very different degrees and 
forms of voluntary involvement.
 
•  Most states remain hesitant to outsource core 
tasks in crisis management to private companies. 
Western and Northern states increasingly 
establish informal coordination mechanisms 
with private companies to manage new threats, 
such as in the area of cyber-security and critical 
infrastructures.
 
•  Citizens largely trust and support their national 
civil security system and there is a generally 
non-alarmist attitude. Civil security tends to be 
characterised by a rather low level of politicization 
and contestation. Some South-Eastern European 
states feature somewhat lower levels of concern 
and institutional trust.
 
•  All countries under investigation seem to be on 
a path of modernisation in the area of planning 
and coordination support systems, such as with 
regard to the use of websites and communication 
systems.
 
•  The wide-spread lack of coherent data on 
spending and planning tools makes it difficult 
to assess the level of preparedness and 
redirect resources towards new challenges, 
which accentuates the generally low level of 
technological reform outlined above. There is little 
pressure to improve national civil security systems 
on the grounds of efficiency.
 
•  While the majority of countries have formal 
legal provisions for the declaration of a state of 
emergency and/or disaster, these have not been 
used to justify unduly wide executive leeway. 
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Those countries that lack corresponding legal 
provisions (mostly for historical reasons) do not 
seem to be less effective or efficient in crisis 
response situations either.
 
•  There is no generally accepted standard or 
methodology for effectiveness assessments. 
Yet, stakeholders seem to be convinced that 
their systems, as a whole, are working rather 
well and can handle most crises. Accordingly, it 
is not possible to set out a single best model in 
this regard that could do justice to the diverse 
institutional structures of different European 
states. If processes of professional inquiries 
and post-incident reviews could be made more 
transparent, that might facilitate national and 
cross-national learning.
 
•  Systems and arrangements for cross-national 
crisis assistance – be it in EU frameworks, 
other multilateral forums or on a bi-lateral level 
– are well developed. With a few exceptions, 
all countries studied by ANVIL have respective 
provisions in place and are also regular 
contributors and/or recipients of such assistance.
NEXT STEPS FOR PRACTICE
Diversity abounds in European civil security systems. 
Our findings cast doubts on whether standardization 
driven ‘from above’ is necessary or even desirable. 
Experience and research in crisis management 
supports the view that the growing complexity of 
threats and crises means that system diversity is not 
necessarily a bad thing – some degree of redundancy 
and overlap may prove quite useful in crisis situations.
Our research found not just diversity but some 
degree of commonality. Almost all EU member 
states have adopted ‘umbrella laws’ on civil security 
issues, revealing a prioritisation of those issues and 
appreciation of modern threats that would have 
been unthinkable just two decades ago. Another 
commonality is the widespread adoption of an ‘all 
hazards’ or ‘multi hazards’ approach, albeit only in 
policy terms rather than organisational or operational 
terms. The meaning of this term could be usefully 
defined more carefully, and its implications for 
constitutional, organisational and operational reforms 
fleshed out. As the EU moves forward in finding its role 
in enhancing security through effective cooperation 
amongst civil security cooperation, a genuine and 
fine-grained appreciation for both diversity and 
commonality thus promises to pay dividends not just 
in cooperation, but also the end-goal: improving the 
security and safety of the European population.
If European Union officials seek to enhance 
cooperation, we would suggest that learning ‘from 
below’ is the way forward to improving compatibilities. 
The EU’s role might be one of platform or actor; 
facilitator or driver; promoter or enforcer. In most 
areas of European integration, the EU is a mix of 
some or all of those descriptors. In the area of civil 
security cooperation in the face of transboundary 
threats, the EU would be best placed as promoter and 
facilitator of cooperation amongst national officials, 
taking special care to ensure common political goals 
adopted in Brussels are reconciled with national 
diversity. That includes focusing on demonstrable 
problems, and testing practitioner-validated reforms, 
through increased analysis and dialogue.
NEXT STEPS FOR RESEARCH
Civil security is a dynamic and increasingly important 
area, but it is often overlooked by academic social 
science research. Based on the ANVIL findings 
and discussions with stakeholders, we can identify 
a number of questions and issues that should be 
addressed in future research on European civil 
security.
A first issue is the relationship between European 
convergence pressures and the persistence of 
diverse local traditions and structures. Future projects 
should investigate whether there are general state 
legacies and roles of public institutions that cut 
across the specificities of national security systems 
and lead to specific regional clusters.  
A second question concerns the role and the 
acceptance of armed forces in domestic emergency 
management, as well as the military’s possible role in 
cross-border civil protection activities inside the EU 
and alongside NATO. The degree to which the military 
can engage in emergency management is sometimes 
a legal question while other times a political and 
normative issue that requires further mapping by 
researchers. A related issue is the role of private 
actors in civil security. In view of the importance 
of voluntary organisations in many European civil 
security systems and simultaneous challenges 
to guarantee adequate levels of volunteerism, we 
need to learn more about innovative forms of social 
involvement as well as drivers and obstacles to 
outsourcing in this sector.
Keeping in mind the often confused and contested 
terminology in civil security, security research should 
look deeper into the conceptual history of central 
terms – such as ‘civil protection’ or ‘resilience’, an 
increasingly popular term – and map their use in 
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different national contexts. This can range from 
practical guidelines to academic discourse analyses; 
whatever the usage, understanding different 
discourses seems critical to achieving a coordinated 
approach.
Future research might also focus on examining 
the exact factors and mechanisms influencing 
comprehensive integrated risk policies at the 
national level. As integral risk assessments also raise 
some normative and political issues, studies could 
investigate the actual societal and political impact of 
risk assessments as currently conducted and debate 
different alternatives models. A related question for 
national systems is the effect of centralisation and 
decentralisation on the overall performance capability 
of civil security systems.
Last but not least, the question of quality and 
performance remain daunting. ANVIL underlined 
that one should not strive for universal assessment 
standards that disregard national traditions and 
social support structures. Future research might 
want to explore opportunities and limits for the 
assessment of civil security systems in a way that 
takes into account the diversity of views and traditions 
identified by ANVIL as well as broader political 
and societal implications. There remains a critical 
need for knowledge in how to carry out efficiency 
assessments, including possible standards for data 
collection, and mutual learning or ‘best practice’ 
exchanges in civil security systems.  This touches on 
the important question of ‘learning’ – a difficult task 
at the national level already and one that becomes 
even more complicated in cross-border settings and 
in response to demanding crises. Further research 
into learning enablers and mechanisms of drawing 
and learning lessons seems warranted and promising.
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[1]  This project has received funding from the European Union’s 
Seventh Framework Programme for research, technological 
development and demonstration under grant agreement no 
284678.
[2]  Interview-based case studies: Croatia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Serbia, Sweden, 
and the UK. Desk studies: Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Norway, Romania, 
Slovakia, Switzerland. Country reports are available via the 
ANVIL homepage: www.anvil-project.net.
[3]  The more detailed synthesis reports, from which much of the 
data presented in this paper are drawn, can be found on the 
ANVIL homepage: www.anvil-project.net.
[4]  The ANVIL mapping protocol broadly understood ‘crises’ as 
serious (materializing) threats to the well-being of citizens 
and the integrity and functioning of critical infrastructures. 
The EM-DAT International Disaster Database (www.emdat.
be) served as a first empirical basis, but country study writers 
added and deleted specific crises as far as necessary 
in order to meet the ANVIL definition of crisis. However, 
absolute numbers therefore should be read with caution due 
to potential lacks of data and different national definitions of 
crisis.
[5]  An all-hazards approach assumes that the origins of the 
threat should not matter for the preparation of the response 
at the strategic level. A specific-threat approach does assume 
that it makes a difference whether one prepares for, say, a 
terrorist attack or the explosion of a chemical plant.
[6]  This figure depicts a heuristic grouping based mainly on 
qualitative assessment, with support of our coding scheme. It 
should be noted that the coding was too diverse to allow for a 
‘hard’ scale.
[7]  Approximate estimates according to available sources. Data 
is available for only 15 of 22 countries.
[8] Not available for Croatia, Norway, Serbia and Switzerland.
[9] Not available for Croatia, Norway, Serbia and Switzerland.
[10]  Barents-Euro-Arctic Region, Baltic Sea Maritime 
Cooperation, Council of Baltic Sea States, Disaster 
Preparedness and Prevention Initiative for South-Eastern 
Europe, Helsinki Commission, International Commission for 
the Protection of the Danube River, International Sava River 
Basin Commission, Visegrad Group.
[11] Not available for Croatia, Norway, Serbia and Switzerland.
[12]   Serbia and Switzerland do not participate. Norway 
participates though it is not an EU member.
[13]  All these distributions patterns are to be interpreted with 
caution due to the relatively small sample and number of 
trainings.
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